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COMMENT
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT WAS NEVER
THIS EASY: RAM COPIES AND THEIR
IMPACT ON THE SCOPE OF
COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
FOR COMPUTER PROGRAMS
Just as people and businesses often find the transition to computers
difficult, integrating computer software into the realm of copyright law
has proven to be a daunting task.1 Incomplete and incorrect knowledge
about the nature and capabilities of computers and computer software
leads to poor decisions by office managers, judges, and legislators alike.2
The failure to consider carefully and thoroughly the future effects of a
decision can lead to serious problems.3
1. See, e.g., Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 712 (2d Cir. 1992)
(stating that "many of the decisions in ... [the] area [of copyright protection of computer
software] reflect the courts' attempt to fit the proverbial square peg in a round hole");
Pamela Samuelson, et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Pro-
grams, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 2308, 2310 (1994) (arguing that existing copyright law does not
adequately protect computer software).
2. See, e.g., Stephen Green, DMV Report Blames Managers for Failure of Computer
System, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 26, 1994, at A5 (reporting that state agency managers
"succumbed too readily to industry hype" in believing that the scrapped computer system
they purchased could use the most advanced technology); John F. McMullen, Editorial -
Reflections on Hacker Sentencing, NEWSBYTES NEWS NETWORK, July 29, 1993 (arguing that
the federal judge hearing a computer crimes case "showed a complete lack of understand-
ing of the technology related to the case"); Belden Menkus, U.S. Stock Exchange Com-
puter Failure Proves Costly, COMPUTER FRAUD & SEC. BULL., Sept. 1994 (describing
impact of computer failure that caused the shutdown of the NASDAQ stock exchange for
150 minutes, and explaining that installation of new telecommunications software caused
the outage). This Comment describes, inter alia, how Congress' simple change in the lan-
guage of the Copyright Act has helped to create the RAM copy problem. See infra notes
39-70 and accompanying text.
3. For an example of such problems in the practical realm, see Stephen Green &
Mary Lynne Vellinga, State Fears a Computer Nightmare, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 16,
1994, at Al (describing California's various problems with outdated, expensive, and obso-
lete computer projects and systems caused in part by the state managers', who purchased
the systems, lack of expertise).
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The Ninth Circuit's decision in MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer,
Inc.4 highlights such a problem in copyright law.5 Despite the Ninth Cir-
cuit's legitimate interpretation of the definitions and provisions of the
Copyright Act of 1976 ("Copyright Act" or "1976 Act"), 6 its decision ef-
fectively holds that the mere act of turning on a computer can infringe the
copyright in the software that runs the machine.7 In practical terms, the
decision permits a company that manufactures operating system software
to prevent other companies from servicing machines that operate under
that software.8 Few in the field, including commentators, customers, and
service organizations, expected such a result, and several commentators
argue that the holding in MAI Systems does not promote the policies
underlying copyright law.9 In addition, the Ninth Circuit's decision, and
those that follow it,10 rest on valid interpretations of the Copyright Act,
but reach conclusions that critics assert are inequitable, impractical, and
nonsensical."1
4. 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 671 (1994).
5. See infra notes 91-243 and accompanying text (describing how MAI Systems and
its progeny, while resting on proper interpretation of the Copyright Act, lead to inequita-
ble results).
6. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) [hereinafter
"Copyright Act" or "1976 Act"].
7. See infra notes 97-154 and accompanying text (describing MAI Systems and the
cases following it). Programs that run a computer are known as "operating system pro-
grams." Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1243 (3d Cir.
1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984); see also PETER J. DENNING & WALTER F.
TicHy, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPUTER Sc. 966 (Anthony Ralston & Edwin D. Reilly eds.,
3d ed. 1993).
8. See infra note 90 (arguing that MAI Systems and its progeny can be used by
software producers to eliminate competition posed by independent service organizations).
9. See, e.g., Ronald S. Katz & Janet S. Arnold, MAI v. Peak: An Unprecedented
Opinion With Sparse Analysis, THE COMPUTER LAWYER, May 1993, at 18 (arguing that the
Ninth Circuit ignored prior case law and did not consider the practical impact of its deci-
sion); Trinnie Arriola, Note, Software Copyright Infringement Claims after MAI Systems v.
Peak Computer, 69 WASH. L. REv. 405 (1994) (arguing that the decision does not promote
the goals of federal copyright law and needlessly harms computer users); Michael E. John-
son, Note, The Uncertain Future of Computer Software Users' Rights in the Aftermath of
MAI Systems, 44 DUKE L.J. 327, 328-29 (Nov. 1994) (arguing that MAI Systems threatens
the rights of software users and suggesting a judicial interpretation of the Copyright Act in
light of its underlying policies to protect users); see also infra notes 257-70 and accompany-
ing text (arguing that courts should use the fair use provision of the Copyright Act to avoid
harm to computer users). Note that Mr. Katz and Ms. Arnold represented the defendant
independent service organizations in MAI Systems.
10. Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 31 U;S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1239 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 18, 1994), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1028 (9th Cir. 1995); Advanced Computer Servs. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.
Va. 1994).
11. See, e.g., Katz & Arnold, supra note 9, at 18 (describing the drastic impact MAI
Systems will have on independent service organizations); Arriola, supra note 9, at 405 (ar-
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The heart of the problem in cases like MAI Systems is the "RAM
copy.""2 RAM, an acronym for Random Access Memory, consists of the
electronic circuitry inside a computer that can store the instructions and
data comprising a computer program.13 For a computer to run any pro-
gram, it must load all or some of the program into RAM. 4 In addition,
when a computer is turned on, the operating system software necessary to
use the computer is automatically loaded into RAM. 5 These technologi-
cal circumstances underlie the central issue of MAI Systems: whether the
loading of a computer program into RAM creates a copy that infringes
the copyright of the program.16
At first glance, § 117 of the Copyright Act appears to provide a simple
solution to this problem.17 It exempts from infringement those copies
guing that MA! Systems subverts software users' rights and fails to account for the practical
realities of the computer industry); Johnson, supra note 9, at 328-29 (arguing that MAI
Systems threatens the rights of software users and impermissibly expands the rights of
copyright owners).
12. This term will be used throughout this Comment to facilitate readability. Use of
the words "copy" and "copies" refers only to the version of a computer program that exists
in RAM, and does not mean necessarily that these versions of computer programs meet
the statutory definition of "copies" under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). See
infra notes 114-54 and accompanying text (discussing courts' analyses of whether RAM
copies meet the statutory definition of "copies" that can infringe).
13. See Advanced Computer Servs., 845 F. Supp. at 362; Denning & Tichy, supra note
7, at 849. RAM requires a constant flow of electricity, and all information stored in RAM
is lost when that flow ceases. Advanced Computer Servs., 845 F. Supp. at 362. Thus, RAM
differs from other forms of electronic storage, such as ROM ("Read Only Memory"), or
magnetic disks and tape, all of which retain their information without electricity. Id. For
example, the program that runs a hand-held calculator exists permanently in ROM even
when the calculator is turned off.
14. MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 517 (9th Cir. 1993), cert.
dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 671 (1994). In' general, the computer loads the program into RAM
from magnetic storage, such as a hard disk drive or floppy disk. Id. at 514.
15. Id. at 518. When a user instructs a computer to begin a program, the computer
loads the necessary elements of the program into RAM because the computer can manipu-
late data and instructions that exist in RAM faster and more easily than data found in
another medium.
16. Infringement of a copyright specifically means to "violate[ I any of the exclusive
rights of the copyright owner as provided by sections 106 through 118" of the Copyright
Act. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (Supp. IV 1992). The exclusive right at issue in this Comment is
the right "to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords." 17 U.S.C.
§ 106(1) (1988). If the act of loading a computer program into RAM is equivalent to re-
producing the work in a copy, then such an act infringes the copyright in that computer
program.
17. The full text of § 117 is as follows:
§ 117. Limitations on exclusive rights: Computer Programs
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement for the
owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making of
another copy or adaptation of that computer program provided:
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that must be made in order to operate the program.18 Clearly the RAM
copies necessarily made in the normal use of computer programs qualify
as copies made in an "essential step" in the utilization of a computer pro-
gram.19 But § 117 allows only lawful "owners" of a copy of a computer
program to use its protection.2" In enacting § 117, Congress, without ex-
planation, contributed to the ambiguity surrounding the language of the
statute when it made only one change to the language proposed by the
commission established to develop amendments to copyright law to
account for computer technology: it replaced the words "rightful posses-
sor" in § 117 with the word "owner."'" This seemingly innocent substitu-
(1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in the
utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and
that it is used in no other manner, or
(2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and that
all archival copies are destroyed in the event that continued possession
of the computer program should cease to be rightful.
Any exact copies prepared in accordance with the provisions of this section may
be leased, sold, or otherwise transferred, along with the copy from which such
copies were prepared, only as part of the lease, sale, or other transfer of all rights
in the program. Adaptations so prepared may be transferred only with the au-
thorization of the copyright owner.
Id. § 117 (1988).
18. Id. § 117(1) (stating that "it is not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a
computer program to make or authorize the making of another copy... provided that such
a new copy.., is created as an essential step in the utilization of the computer program in
conjunction with a machine").
19. Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 261 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that
a RAM copy made during use qualifies as an "essential step" copy regardless of the user's
purpose in running the program); Robert A. Kreiss, Section 117 of the Copyright Act, 1991
B.Y.U. L. REV. 1497, 1525 (1991) ("[ljoading a program into a computer [(making a RAM
copy)] is an obvious example of the making of a permissible copy under [§ 117(1)]"); see
also MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 n.5 (9th Cir. 1993) ("Since
MAI licensed its software, the Peak customers [i.e. users of MAI computers and software
who have Peak service their machines] do not qualify as 'owners' of the software and are
not eligible for protection under § 117"); infra notes 42-90 and accompanying text
(describing how the cases holding that § 117 does not apply to RAM copies did so only on
the ground that the defendants were not "owners" of the software, and did not reach
whether preparing a RAM copy meets the "essential step" exception).
20. MAI Systems, 991 F.2d at 518; S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1089 n.9
(9th Cir. 1989); Advanced Computer Servs. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Va.
1994); Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1239 (N.D. Cal.
1994), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1028 (9th Cir.
1995); CMAX/Cleveland, Inc. v. UCR, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 337 (MD. Ga. 1992); Hubco Data
Prod. Corp. v. Management Assistance Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q. 450 (D. Idaho 1983); Stephen
Kyle Tapp & Daniel E. Wanat, Computer Software Copyright Issues: Section 117 and Fair
Use, 22 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 197, 238-58 (1992); Kreiss, supra note 19, at 1537-38; see also
infra notes 47-70 and accompanying text (analyzing courts' interpretations of the § 117's
ownership requirement).
21. In 1974, Congress created the National Commission on New Technological Uses of
Copyrighted Works [hereinafter "CONTU"] to study changes in copyright law needed to
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tion causes problems that § 117 was supposed to avoid.22 The defendants
in the RAM copy cases, and nearly all users of commercial software, are
not owners but licensees of computer programs, and thus do not necessar-
ily qualify for the § 117 defenses.23
This Comment explains the nature of copyright problems arising from
the RAM copy, and proposes alternative interpretations of copyright law
that lead to more practical solutions. This Comment begins with a discus-
sion of the history of copyright protection for computer programs, includ-
ing the congressional amendments to the Copyright Act that specifically
address computer programs; in particular § 117. This Comment next ex-
amines how the provisions of amendments most relevant to RAM copies
have been interpreted and applied. This Comment then analyzes the
three cases that have addressed whether RAM copies infringe the copy-
right in a computer program, giving detailed consideration to the various
defenses asserted by the alleged infringers. Finally, this Comment pro-
poses an analysis to solve the RAM copy problem that does not disregard
the language of the Copyright Act.
accommodate the increasing use of machines such as computers and photocopiers. Act of
Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, tit. 2, § 206(b), 88 Stat. 1873 (codified as amended at 2
U.S.C. § 206(b) (Supp. IV 1974)). CONTU issued its report in 1978. FINAL REPORT OF
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS
(1978) [hereinafter "CONTU REPORT"]. The language CONTU proposed for § 117 al-
lowed "rightful possessors" to use its defenses. Compare id. at 12 (using the term "rightful
possessors") with 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1988) (using the term "owners"). The legislative history
behind the enactment of § 117 does not explain the change. See H.R. REP. No. 1307, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, 23, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460, 6482. For speculation by
commentators as to the reasons for change, see infra note 41. On January 17, 1995, Rep.
Joseph K. Knollenberg (Michigan) introduced a bill that would, if enacted, change the
word "owner" back to "rightful possessor." H.R. 533, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
22. See CONTU REPORT, supra note 21, at 13 (explaining that, because a RAM copy
is capable of infringement, then some protection should exist to users who automatically
and necessarily create RAM copies simply by using a computer program). CONTU con-
cluded that "the law should provide that persons in rightful possession of copies of pro-
grams be able to use them freely without fear of exposure to copyright liability." Id.; see
infra note 77 (quoting in full CONTU's stated desire to protect the rightful use of a com-
puter program from infringement liability); see also Johnson, supra note 9, at 331 (describ-
ing CONTU's attempt to strike a balance between the rights of owners of copyrights in
computer programs and users of computer programs).
23. A "licensee" is defined as a "[pierson to whom a license has been granted."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 921 (6th ed. 1990). A "license" is defined broadly as "[l]eave
to do thing which the licensor could prevent." Id. at 920. Because the computer programs
at issue in RAM copy cases were conveyed to the users under a license agreement and not
through a sale, the users were deemed licensees, not owners. See infra notes 47-70 and
accompanying text (analyzing the case law applying § 117 to licensees); Johnson, supra
note 9, at 341-48 (arguing that users of computer programs conveyed under restrictive
license agreements should be deemed owners for purposes of § 117).
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I. FOUNDATION OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR
COMPUTER SOFTWARE
A. Pre-1978 Copyright Law
Before 1978, computer programs received uncertain treatment under
copyright law.2 4 In this period, copyright protection was governed by the
Copyright Act of 1909.25 For obvious reasons, computer programs did
not receive explicit treatment under this statute. However, courts re-
jected copyright protection for works analogous to computer programs;
that is, works that were used in conjunction with a machine that could not
be read by humans. 6 In 1964, the Copyright Office 7 first accepted com-
puter programs for registration under its "rule of doubt."2 8 Only after
Congress began the process of revising the copyright law, which
culminated in the 1976 Act, did computer programs receive explicit treat-
ment under copyright law.2 9
B. The Copyright Act of 1976
Despite its efforts to include computer programs in the 1976 revision of
the copyright laws, Congress did not address computer programs explic-
itly in the 1976 Act as originally enacted. 30 However, Congress defined
24. CONTU REPORT, supra note 21, at 9.
25. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, Ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).
26. White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908) (holding that
copying musical works in the form of piano rolls used in player pianos did not constitute
infringement because the information contained on the rolls could not be read by humans);
see also Brown Instrument Co. v. Warner, 161 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir.) (holding that a cali-
brated graphic chart used by a machine was not copyrightable because it failed to convey
information to a human), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 801 (1947).
27. The Copyright Office, located within the Library of Congress, maintains copyright
registrations and performs other related tasks. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 701-710 (1988). Each reg-
istrant must submit copies of the copyrighted work with his or her application, which be-
come part of the Library's holdings. Id. § 704. Registration with the Copyright Office is
not necessary to obtain copyright protection but it provides valuable procedural benefits,
such as prima facie evidence of ownership and validity of the copyright. See id. §§ 411-412.
28. CONTU REPORT, supra note 21, at 15. The Copyright Office required authors to
submit human-readable versions of the programs. Id. The "rule of doubt" refers to the
Copyright Office's reluctance to use its power to deny registration of submitted works if
any doubt exists as to whether the work is copyrightable. ROBERT A. GORMAN & JANE C.
GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT FOR THE NINETIES 49 (4th ed. 1994).
29. CONTU REPORT, supra note 21, at 3-4 (describing the history of copyright protec-
tion for computer programs).
30. See 17 U.S.C § 117 (Supp. 11977) (amended 1980). Prior to 1980, § 117 provided
that:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 through 116 and 118, this title
does not afford to the owner of copyright in a work any greater or lesser rights
with respect to the use of the work in conjunction with automatic systems capable
of storing, processing, retrieving, or transferring information, or in conjunction
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the term "copies" with new and future technological advances in mind,
and provided that "copies" include works that can be perceived only with
the aid of a machine.31 This definition of "copies" plays a vital role in the
"RAM copy" problem.
32
C. The Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works
(CONTU) and the 1980 Amendments
Congress established CONTU in 1974 to study and propose legislation
regarding the reproduction and use of copyrighted works in relation to
computers and photocopiers.33 In 1978, CONTU issued its report and
proposed legislation.34 A majority of the commissioners35 concluded that
copyright law should protect computer programs.36 CONTU proposed
two changes to copyright law: (1) add a definition of "computer pro-
gram" to § 101, and (2) repeal the old § 117 and replace it with a new
with any similar device, machine, or process, than those afforded to works under
the law, whether title 17 or the common law or statutes of a State, in effect on
December 31, 1977, as held applicable and construed by a court in an action
brought under this title.
Id. This provision held computer program issues in abeyance until CONTU submitted its
recommendations to Congress. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 116 (1976), re-
printed in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5731.
31. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988); see also H.R. REp. No. 1476, supra note 30, at 52, reprinted
in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5665 (explaining that the new definition of "copies" is intended to
avoid the problems posed by cases like White-Smith Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.); infra
notes 114-54 and accompanying text (analyzing courts' interpretation of the definition of
"copies" in terms of a computer program loaded into RAM).
32. See infra notes 114-54 and accompanying text (analyzing the courts' interpretation
of the statutory definitions of "copies" and "fixed" as applied to RAM copies).
33. Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, tit. 2, §§ 204, 206(b), 88 Stat. 1873 (codi-
fied as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 201, 206(b) (Supp. IV 1974)). Efforts to study the effects of
new technology on copyright law began as early as 1967 with Sen. John L. McClellan and
the Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights. CONTU REPORT,
supra note 21, at 3-4.
34. See CONTU REPORT, supra note 21. The report came two years after Congress
had enacted the 1976 Act. See id. at 7. Congress anticipated CONTU's recommendations
regarding photocopying in certain sections of the 1976 Act. Id. (describing the codification
of the "fair use" doctrine in § 107 and the grant of specific exemptions of infringement for
certain uses by libraries and archives in § 108.) However, Congress expressly refrained
from addressing copyright protection in computer programs until CONTU published its
recommendations. Id.; see also supra note 30 (containing the text of the provisional § 117).
35. The following 14 individuals served as the commissioners of CONTU: Stanley H.
Fuld, Chairman; Melville B. Nimmer, Vice-Chairman; George D. Cary; William S. Dix;
John Hersey; Rhoda H. Karpatkin; Dan M. Lacy; Arthur R. Miller; E. Gabriel Perle; Her-
shel B. Sarbin; Robert Wedgeworth; Alice E. Wilcox; Daniel Boorstin (ex officio); and
Babara A. Ringer (ex officio). CONTU REPORT, supra note 21, at ix.
36. Id. at 12. All of the commissioners agreed that some form of intellectual property
protection should cover computer programs. Id. However, three of the commissioners
disagreed as to whether copyright law should provide that protection. Id.
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proposed § 117.17 These changes were designed to provide clear statu-
tory protection for computer programs without inhibiting their rightful
use.
38
In 1980, Congress enacted computer-related amendments to the Copy-
right Act, noting in the legislative history that the amendments adopted
CONTU's recommendations.39 The only change Congress made to
CONTU's proposed legislation was to substitute the word "owner" for
the phrase "rightful possessor" in the first paragraph of § 117.40 Congress
gave no explanation for this change. 4'
II. INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE § 117 PRIVILEGES
Since 1980, federal courts have interpreted and applied § 117 to a vari-
ety of circumstances. 4 2 The applicability of § 117 to the RAM copy situa-
37. Id. The proposed definition of "computer program," which was enacted without
change, is as follows: "A 'computer program' is a set of statements or instructions to be
used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result." Id.;
accord 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). The proposed § 117 contained language identical to the
section eventually enacted, except that CONTU proposed the phrase "rightful possessor"
instead of the enacted "owner" in the first paragraph of the section. Compare CONTU
REPORT, supra note 21, at 12 with 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1988).
38. CONTU REPORT, supra note 21, at 12 (explaining that the proposed changes to
§ 101 and § 117 should "make the law clear regarding both proprietors' and users' rights"
and should "provide reasonable protection for proprietors without unduly burdening users
of programs and the general public").
39. H.R. REP. No. 1307, supra note 21, at 23, reprinted in 1980 U.S.S.C.A.N. at 6482
(explaining that the amendments "embod[y] the recommendations of [CONTU] ... with
respect to clarifying the law of copyright of computer software"). Courts generally con-
sider the CONTU REPORT to be the legislative history to the 1980 amendments to the
Copyright Act. Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 260-61 (5th Cir. 1988);
Micro-Sparc, Inc. v. Amtype Corp., 592 F. Supp. 33, 35 (D. Mass. 1984); Atari, Inc. v. JS &
A Group, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 5, 9 (N.D. I11. 1983).
40. See supra notes 21 and 37 (describing the change made by Congress to the
CONTU draft legislation).
41. See H.R. REP. No. 1307, supra note 21, at 23, reprinted in 1980 U.S.S.C.A.N. at
6482. Commentators have speculated as to why the change was made. See, e.g., U.S.
CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, FINDING A BALANCE: COMPUTER
SOFTWARE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND THE CHALLENGE OF TECHNOLOGICAL
CHANGE 68 (1992) (speculating that the change "reflected concerns of the Justice Depart-
ment relating to antitrust considerations"); Cary H. Sherman, Special Problems With Com-
puter Uses of Copyrighted Works: What Does Section 117 Really Mean?, in COMPUTER
LAW INST. 1986, at 313 (PLI Pat., Copyright, Trademark & Literary Prop. Course Hand-
book Series No. 230, 1986) (noting that sources inside CONTU reveal that the change was
made to leave intact the rights of parties operating under existing licensing agreements);
Tapp & Wanat, supra note 20, at 239 n.176 (hypothesizing that change was made to harmo-
nize § 117 with language in § 109, the "first-sale" doctrine).
42. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, 594 F. Supp. 617, 622 (C.D. Cal.
1984) (rejecting a claim that placing a copy of a computer program onto ROM chips is an
"essential step"); Micro-Sparc, Inc. v. Amtype Corp., 592 F. Supp. 33, 35 (D. Mass. 1984)
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tion, if any, would be through § 117(1), which allows the making of a copy
when it is an "essential step" in utilizing the computer program. 43 How-
ever, before reaching § 117(1), it is necessary to resolve the threshold is-
sue of who is entitled to use § 117.44 This issue is critical in the cases
involving independent service organizations.45 Thus, in analyzing the
RAM copy situation, the most important decisions are those that have
construed the "ownership" and "essential step" requirements of § 117.46
A. Section 117 and its Ownership Requirement
The cases interpreting the ownership requirement of § 117 fall roughly
into three categories: (i) those where possession of the copy of the com-
puter program was found to be unlawful, and therefore § 117 was held
not to apply without determining whether the defendant was an owner or
possessor;47 (ii) those where the courts narrowly construe "owner" to ex-
clude licensees as mere possessors;48 and (iii) two cases that implicitly
(rejecting a claim that typing a program into a computer and then making duplicate copies
onto disk is an "essential step").
43. Two other activities are permitted by § 117: the making of adaptations of a com-
puter program when such adaptations are essential to the utilization of the program and
the making of archival or backup copies. 17 U.S.C. § 117(1), (2) (1988). Neither activity
encompasses the making of a RAM copy to use a computer program. See id.
44. MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993), cert.
dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 671 (1994); Advanced Computer Servs. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F.
Supp. 356, 367 (E.D. Va. 1994); Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 31
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1239, 1242 n.4 (N.D. Cal. 1994), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other
grounds, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1028 (9th Cir. 1995).
45. MAI Sys., 991 F.2d at 518; Advanced Computer Servs., 845 F. Supp. at 367; Triad
Sys., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1242 n.4.
46. This is true because RAM copies do not implicate § 117(2), which allows owners of
a copy of a computer program to make archival copies to protect against electronic or
mechanical failure. 17 U.S.C. § 117(2) (1988); see also supra notes 17 and 43 (quoting full
text of § 117 and describing the activities it permits).
47. See ISC-Bunker Ramo Corp. v. Altech, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1310, 1332 (N.D. I11.
1990) (holding that § 117 "affords no immunity whatsoever to infringers... that have come
into unauthorized possession of the software"); GCA Corp. v. Chance, 217 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 718, 721 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (denying § 117 protection to defendants who "took pro-
tected works with full knowledge that they had no right to them"); cf Apple Computer,
Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 617, 621-22 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (denying § 117 privi-
lege to defendant reseller, who rightfully possessed the computer program but who was not
the intended "owner-user" of the computer program).
48. MAI Sys., 991 F.2d at 518 (denying § 117 protection to licensees); S.O.S., Inc. v.
Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1089 n.9 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that "[an owner of a copy of
computer software has certain rights under the Copyright Act which a mere possessor does
not"); Advance Computer Servs., 845 F. Supp. at 367; Triad Sys., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1242 n.4;
CMAX/Cleveland, Inc. v. UCR, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 337, 356 (M.D. Ga. 1992) (refusing to
allow defendant § 117 protection because it was a lessee and possessor and not an owner);
Hubco Data Prods. Corp. v. Management Assistance Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 450, 456
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construed "owner" broadly to include a licensee.49 The trend of the cases
leans toward the second alternative, which prevents licensees from using
§ 117.50
The leading case against the trend, Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software
Ltd. ,51 interprets the word "owner" broadly, but does not expressly con-
front the clear language of the statute.52 The plaintiff, Vault, created a
computer program that other software producers could use to lock their
own computer programs and prevent copying by their customers.53 Vault
conveyed the program to customers through a "shrink-wrap" license
54
under which Vault retained title to the copy of its locking software. 55 De-
fendant Quaid lawfully obtained a copy of Vault's program, ran the pro-
gram-which necessarily copied the program into RAM-to observe
how it worked, and then used this information to create a program, called
(D. Idaho 1983) (excluding defendant from § 117's protection because the defendant used
its customers' software which it did not possess).
49. Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 261 (5th Cir. 1988) (allowing a
licensee to use § 117); Foresight Resources Corp. v. Pfortmiller, 719 F. Supp. 1006, 1009-10
(D. Kan. 1989) (concluding that "[t]here is no question that [the defendant] is the lawful
owner of a copy of the ... program," despite the license agreement governing the convey-
ance of the program).
50. Since 1988, when the Fifth Circuit in Vault construed "owner" broadly, the Ninth
Circuit and the Eastern District of Virginia have narrowly construed the term. See supra
note 48 (citing cases narrowly construing the "ownership" requirement). Moreover, sev-
eral commentators approve of this narrow reading. See, e.g., Kreiss, supra note 19, at 1537-
38 (arguing that Congress' change to a narrower class of persons entitled to § 117's protec-
tion should be upheld); Tapp & Wanat, supra note 20, at 258 (arguing that "owner" should
be construed in favor of the copyright holder, and thus exclude licensees). Contra Arriola,
supra note 9, at 422-23 (arguing that a narrow construction of the term "owner" contra-
venes the policy behind § 117 of protecting software users' rights); Johnson, supra note 9,
at 341-45 (arguing that the policies behind § 117 support a construction of "owners" to
include licensees); Richard H. Stem, Section 117 of the Copyright Act: Charter of the
Software Users' Rights or an Illusory Promise?, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 459, 467 & 478-85
(1985) (contending that the term "owner" would permit "sleight of hand" by software pro-
ducers to avoid § 117 and proposing amendments to reinstate CONTU's "rightful posses-
sor" language).
51. 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
52. Id. at 260-61.
53. Id. at 256.
54. A "shrink-wrap" license is one that is visible on the unopened packaging of the
computer software and makes acceptance of the terms of the license automatic upon the
opening of the package. See Page M. Kaufman, Note, The Enforceability of State "Shrink-
Wrap" License Statutes in Light of Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 74 CORNELL L.
REV. 222, 222-23 n.9 (1988).
55. Vault, 847 F.2d at 257 n.2. The license provided that "[t]itle to the Licensed
Software and all copyrights and proprietary rights in the Licensed Software shall remain
with VAULT." Id.
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"RAMKEY," which defeated the copy-protection provided by Vault's
program.56
Despite quoting in its entirety the language of both the proposed and
enacted versions of § 117, and noting that Congress had changed the
words "rightful possessor" to "owner," the court in Vault did not discuss
whether Quaid was an owner or possessor.57 Instead, it analyzed only
whether Quaid's creation of the RAM copy met the "essential step" re-
quirement of § 117(1).58 Therefore, the court held sub silentio that Quaid
"owned" the copy of the computer program.59
The cases that narrowly construe "owner" to exclude software licensees
usually do so without much discussion.60 The cases simply rely on the
users' status as licensees to conclude that they do not qualify as "owners"
56. Id. at 257. Despite Quaid's surreptitious motive, the copy of Vault's program that
it loaded into RAM was the same copy that must be loaded for someone to use the pro-
gram as it was intended. Id. at 261. Whether this creation of a RAM copy qualifies for the
"essential step" exception under § 117(1) is discussed infra in the text accompanying notes
71-90.
57. See Vault, 847 F.2d at 260-61.
58. Id. at 261.
59. See Tapp & Wanat, supra note 20, at 247. In a separate section of the opinion, the
court ruled that the Louisiana Software License Enforcement Act could not be tised to
enforce Vault's license because the Act was, in part, preempted by the federal Copyright
Act. Vault, 847 F.2d at 268-70. One might argue that, because the license was unenforce-
able, Vault's retention of title to the copy of the computer program was not valid and
proprietary ownership of the tangible copy passed to Quaid. See John M. Conley & Vance
F. Brown, Revisiting § 117 of the Copyright Act: An Economic Approach, THE COMPUTER
LAW., Nov. 1990, at 1, 5. This argument becomes circular when one realizes that the license
and the Louisiana Act touched upon areas of federal concern, in part, by limiting rights
Quaid had under § 117. Vault, 847 F.2d at 270. This reasoning assumes that Quaid had
rights to the tangible property as an owner in the first place. See Conley & Brown, supra,
at 5; Charles R. McManis, Intellectual Property Protection and Reverse Engineering of
Computer Programs in the United States and European Community, 8 HIGH TECH. L.J. 24,
83-84 (1993).
60. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993) (denying
§ 117 protection to licensees), cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 671 (1994); S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday,
Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1089 n.9 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting that "[a]n owner of a copy of software
has certain rights under the Copyright Act which a mere possessor does not"); Advanced
Computer Servs. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 362-64, 367 (E.D. Va. 1994) (denying
§ 117 protection to licensees); Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1239 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (denying § 117 protection to licensees), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part on other grounds, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1028 (9th Cir. 1995); CMAX/Cleveland, Inc.
v. UCR, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 337, 356 (M.D. Ga. 1992) (refusing to allow defendant § 117
protection because the defendant was a lessee and possessor and not an owner); Hubco
Data Prods. Corp. v. Management Assistance Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 450,456 (D. Idaho
1983) (excluding defendant from § 117's protection because the defendant used its custom-
ers' software which it did not own).
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under § 117.61 The opinions generally do not discuss the changes in lan-
guage from the CONTU proposal.62
The case for the broad construction of "owner" exemplified by Vault is
difficult to maintain.63 First, it contradicts the plain language of the stat-
ute.64 The Supreme Court has held that the language of the copyright
laws must be construed according to its common law meaning.65 There-
fore, the term "owner" in § 117 should be given its ordinary meaning,
which excludes licensees who do not take title to the copy of the pro-
gram.66 Second, it ignores the only change Congress made to CONTU's
proposed § 117-a change that implies that Congress intended a distinc-
tion between "owner" and "rightful possessor" in § 117.67 Third, the
broad interpretation fails to recognize that Congress has specifically dis-
tinguished between "owners" and "possessors" in § 109,68 similar to § 117
61. MAI Sys., 991 F.2d at 518 n.5; S.O.S., Inc., 886 F.2d at 1088-89 n.9; Advanced
Computer Servs., 845 F. Supp. at 367; Triad Sys., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1242 n.4; Hubco, 219
U.S.P.Q. at 456. While the discussion in some cases is too simple, it is not fundamentally
flawed. For example, in Triad Sys. and Hubco, the court noted that the alleged infringers,
which were outside organizations authorized by plaintiff's customers to use the software at
issue, could not use § 117 because the outside organizations did not "own" the customers'
software. Triad Sys., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1242 n.4; Hubco, 219 U.S.P.Q. at 456. The courts in
both cases overlooked the provision of § 117 that would allow a customer, if considered an
"owner," to authorize the use of software permitted by § 117. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1988 &
Supp. V 1994) (stating "it is not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer
program to make or authorize the making of another copy.")(emphasis added). This point
does not change the result because the license agreements render the customers non-own-
ers and therefore unable to avail themselves of § 117. See S.O.S., Inc., 886 F.2d at 1088-89
n.9.
62. MAI Sys., 991 F.2d at 518 n.5; S.O.S., Inc., 886 F.2d at 1088-89 n.9; Advanced
Computer Servs., 845 F. Supp. at 367; Triad Sys., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1242 n.4; Hubco, 219
U.S.P.Q. at 456.
63. See Kreiss, supra note 19, at 1535-39; Tapp & Wanat, supra note 20, at 255-58;
Conley & Brown, supra note 59, at 3. Contra Johnson, supra note 9, at 341-45 (arguing
that the broad construction of "owner" is more consistent with the policies behind the
Copyright Act than an interpretation based on the common law understanding of the
term).
64. Kreiss, supra note 19, at 1535-38.
65. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989) (stating
that " 'where Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled meaning under ... the
common law, a court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means
to incorporate the established meaning of these terms' ") (quoting NLRB v. Amax Coal
Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329 (1981)).
66. Kreiss, supra note 19, at 1537-38 (concluding that § 117's legislative history as a
whole supports giving the term "owner" as used in § 117 its common law meaning).
67. Id. (arguing that Congress' change from "rightful possessor" to "owner" is the
most logical means through which Congress could express its intent to limit the class of
persons entitled to § 117's protection).
68. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a)-(d) (1988 & Supp. V 1994) (making an explicit distinction
between "owner of a copyright in a computer program" and "person in possession of a
particular copy of a computer program").
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in that § 109 provides to "owners," and not "possessors," the right to sell,
lease, lend, or otherwise dispose of the tangible copies of copyrighted
works.69 Thus, "owner" should be construed according to its common
law definition, which does not include licensees who do not take title to
the copy of the computer program.70
B. Section 117 and the "Essential Step" Privilege
One cannot use computer software without creating RAM copies.71
Such copies are essential to the use of a computer program. Thus, the
making of RAM copies falls within the "essential step" exception set
forth in § 117(1).72 The only case law supporting this conclusion is Vault
Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd. .7 All other cases involving RAM copies
never reached the "essential step" issue because the courts held that
those who made the RAM copies failed to meet § 117's "ownership" re-
quirements.74 Despite the dearth of case law on this issue, the purpose
and intent behind § 117(1), as described in the CONTU report,75 reveal
that RAM copies qualify for its protection.76 Indeed, the CONTU report
indicates that § 117(1) was drafted precisely for the purpose of making
RAM copies non-infringing.77
69. Id.; Tapp & Wanat, supra note 20, at 215 n.67 (arguing that § 117's "owner" should
be read in harmony with § 109's more explicit requirement that its provisions only apply
when the defendant owns, and not merely possesses, a copy of a work).
70. Accord Kreiss, supra note 19, at 1535-38; Tapp & Wanat, supra note 20, at 258.
71. See DENNIS J. FRAILEY, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPUTER Sci. 245-46, 251 (Anthony
Ralston & Edwin D. Reilly eds., 3d ed. 1993).
72. Kreiss, supra note 19, at 1525; see also CONTU REPORT, supra note 21, at 13
(stating that "[o]ne who rightfully possesses a copy of a program ... should be provided
with a legal right to copy it to the extent which will permit its use by that possessor").
73. 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
74. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
75. See CONTU REPORT, supra note 21, at 12-13.
76. Id. at 13, 21 (describing how the proposed § 117 was designed to allow "rightful
possessors" of computer programs to use them without fear of copyright liability).
77. In describing the purpose behind the proposed § 117, the CONTU REPORT states
that:
[t]he law should provide that persons in rightful possession of copies of programs
be able to use them freely without fear of copyright liability .... It is easy to
imagine ... a situation in which the copyright owner might desire, for good rea-
son or none at all, to force a lawful owner or possessor of a copy to stop using a
particular program. One who rightfully possesses a copy of a program, therefore,
should be provided with a legal right to copy it to that extent which will permit its
use by that possessor. This would include the right to load it into a computer [i.e.,
to make RAM copies] ....
CONTU REPORT, supra note 21, at 13. This statement of purpose demonstrates CONTU's
conclusion that RAM copies made automatically when a computer program is used must
be considered non-infringing. See id. In CONTU's opinion, to conclude otherwise would
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In addition to its implying that a licensee can use § 117,78 Vault held
that a RAM copy necessarily made during the operation of a computer
program met the statutory exception to infringement provided by
§ 117(1). 79 At issue was whether the licensee's use of the program for a
purpose different than the one intended by the copyright owner should
bar application of § 117(1).80 Vault argued that the words "and that it is
used in no other manner"'" permit the making of RAM copies only when
the software is used as the copyright owner intends.82 Vault argued that
because the licensee used the Vault's software only to create a program
designed to defeat the copy protection provided by Vault's program, any
RAM copies made in furtherance of that purpose should not qualify for
§ 117(1) protection. 3 The court rejected this limitation as not expressly
required by the language of the statute.84 Despite the court's thin reason-
ing, its conclusion is supported by the purpose behind § 117(1) as ex-
pressed in the CONTU Report.85 CONTU wanted the statute to protect
users of computer programs from copyright owners who had "good rea-
son or none at all"86 for prohibiting the mere use of their programs.
Thus, the court held correctly that the protection of § 117(1) should apply
to RAM copies made in the "essential steps" of using a program regard-
less of the motive behind the users' running of the program.87
Therefore, if a court reaches the issue of whether a RAM copy meets
the "essential step" requirement of § 117(1), then it should conclude that
it does.88 The problem is that few courts get beyond § 117's ownership
allow the mere use of computer programs to support a claim for copyright infringement.
Id.
78. See supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
79. Vault, 847 F.2d at 261 (stating that the RAM copy "made by Quaid was 'created as
an essential step in the utilization' of Vault's program").
80. Id.
81. 17 U.S.C. § 117(1) (1988). See supra note 17 for the full text of § 117.
82. Vault, 847 F.2d at 261.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See supra note 77 (describing CONTU's purpose for § 117).
86. CONTU REPORT, supra note 21, at 13.
87. An example of a RAM copy that is not an "essential step" and thus might not
receive § 117 protection is where one uses another software application to decompile the
program at issue and view its contents on the screen. The decompiler translates the pro-
gram and displays its contents on the screen in a form readable by humans. In this form,
the program exists in RAM in the same way a document exists in RAM when it is being
edited by a word processing program. In this form the program cannot be used by the
computer.
88. See CONTU REPORT, supra note 21, at 13 (stating that the rightful possessor
should have the legal right to copy a program in order to use it); Kreiss, supra note 19, at




requirement.89 Critics assert that the ramifications of failing to receive
§ 117's protection can be enormous: providing a windfall of monopoly
and control to copyright owners, while putting their competitors out of
business.90
III. DEATH OF INDEPENDENT SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS:
MAI SYSTEMS, AD VANCED COMPUTER SERVICES, AND
TRIAD SYSTEMS
The minor change of "rightful possessors" to "owners" in § 117 se-
verely harms independent service organizations (ISOs), which are compa-
nies that repair computers without any agreement or relationship with
the companies that manufacture the computer and its software. 91 Such a
relationship usually does not exist because the ISOs compete with the
computer manufacturers for the service business. 92 Three cases with al-
most identical fact patterns decided since early 1993, MAI Systems Corp.
v. Peak Computer, Inc. , Advanced Computer Services of Michigan, Inc.
v. MAI Systems Corp. ,94 and Triad Systems Corp. v. Southeastern Express
Co. , have given computer manufacturers a near-perfect weapon against
ISOs in the battle for customer service needs: the RAM copy.96
89. See supra notes 47-70 and accompanying text (describing § 117's ownership re-
quirement, which is often dispositive).
90. See, e.g., Independents Vow to Fight Court Copyright Decision Affecting Computer
Maintenance, SOFTWARE INDUSTRY REP., Apr. 19, 1993, at 9 ("If upheld, this decision -
MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer Inc. - would essentially gut the multibillion dollar
independent computer service industry.").
91. See Advanced Computer Servs. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 359 (E.D. Va.
1994) (describing the nature of an independent service organization).
92. Id. (stating that 90% of the market for service and maintenance of MAI computers
is controlled by MAI, with the remaining 10% controlled by small independent service
organizations).
93. 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 671 (1994).
94. 845 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Va. 1994).
95. 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1239 (N.D. Cal. 1994), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other
grounds, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1028 (9th Cir. 1995). After denying motions for summary
judgment, the case went to trial. 36 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1030. At the close of the evidence, the
trial court granted directed verdicts in favor of Triad Systems on Southeastern's fair use
defense. Id. at 1031. Then, the jury found that Southeastern had infringed Triad Systems'
copyrights. Id. After the verdict, the trial court granted Triad Systems' motion for prelimi-
nary injunction, which Southeastern appealed to the Ninth Circuit. Id. The other rulings
were not entered as part of a final judgment because the trial on the issue of Southeastern's
counterclaims was still pending. Id.
96. See Katz & Arnold, supra note 9, 19-20 (predicting the impact of the decisions on
ISOs).
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A. The Facts of the ISO Cases
In each of these cases, the plaintiff manufactured computer systems
and designed software for these systems.97 The software included operat-
ing system software, which is necessary to run any other software on the
computer systems, and diagnostic software, which helps technicians ser-
vice the computer system's hardware. 98 The software was conveyed to
the plaintiff's customers through a license agreement that prohibited ac-
cess to the software by third parties.99 The licenses did not expressly pro-
vide that the software producer retained title to the tangible copy of the
software program; that is, the diskettes containing the program. 100 The
defendants, 1 ' who were the ISOs, serviced these computer systems, in
most cases without entering into license agreements with the plaintiffs. 0 2
97. MAI Systems Corporation was involved in two of the three cases, in one of which
it was the defendant. In 1993, MAI Systems brought the first successful RAM copy case
against Peak Computer. MAI Sys., 991 F.2d 511, 523-24. Boosted by this victory, it sent
cease and desist letters to all ISOs servicing MAI computer systems. Advanced Computer
Servs., 845 F. Supp. at 359-60. This action prompted the ISOs to file an antitrust and
declaratory judgment action against MAI Systems in the District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia. Id. at 359. MAI Systems filed counterclaims for copyright infringe-
ment, based predominately on the RAM copy theory from its case against Peak Computer.
Id. at 360-61. The third RAM Copy case, Triad Sys., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1239, involved
different companies, but an identical fact scenario. Plaintiff Triad Systems, which manufac-
tured computer systems and software for auto parts stores, sued Southeastern Express, an
independent service organization, for the unauthorized creation of RAM copies during
service of Triad computers. Id. at 1239-40. Note that Southeastern and the ISOs in Ad-
vanced Computer Servs. were represented by the same law firm. Id. at 1239; Advanced
Computer Servs., 845 F. Supp. at 358.
98. MAI Sys., 991 F.2d at 513, 518 & n. 4; Advanced Computer Servs., 845 F. Supp. at
360; Triad Sys., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1240.
99. MAI Sys., 991 F.2d at 517 n.3; Advanced Computer Servs., 845 F. Supp. at 361 n.6,
367; Triad Sys., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1241; MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., No. CV 92-
1654-R, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21829, at *4 & n.2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 1992).
100. None of the cases discussed the ownership requirement of § 117. See supra notes
47-70 and accompanying text (describing ownership requirement of § 117). The courts ap-
parently assumed that a licensee does not qualify as an owner of a copy, regardless of
whether the license agreement specifies that the licensee does not obtain title to the tangi-
ble copy of the program. In Triad Sys., however, the Northern District of California held
that early versions of the software agreements were "sales agreements whereby the
software customer [became] the owner of the particular software with full rights to copy
and authorize the making of copies for uses permitted under 17 U.S.C. § 117," and there-
fore precluded any infringement action based on the copying of these versions of the
software. 31 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1241. From this fact, one can infer that the later license agree-
ments at issue in Triad Sys. did not pass title to the customer.
101. See supra note 97 (discussing why the ISOs in Advanced Computer Services were
the name plaintiffs).
102. In MAI Sys., the ISO had one license to operate MAI Systems software on one
computer system. 991 F.2d at 519. In Advanced Computer Servs., one of the ISOs had a
license for two of the four MAI Systems' computer systems at its facilities. 845 F. Supp. at
361 n.5. See also Triad Sys., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1242 n.3 (stating that the ISO may have had
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B. The Copyright Infringement Claims in the Cases
The plaintiffs claimed that the ISOs directly infringed the copyrights in
their software through the following activities: (i) the use of operating
system software that is licensed only to one customer; 0 3 (ii) the use of
diagnostic software that is licensed only to one customer;104 and (iii) the
use of unlicensed software on computers at the ISOs' facilities.0 5 Also,
one plaintiff"0 6 claimed that the ISOs induced the customers to allow the
ISOs' technicians to use the plaintiff's software, which allegedly consti-
tuted contributory infringement. 0 7 The first two acts are important be-
cause they can constitute infringement only if the loading of software into
RAM creates a copy of the computer program. 10 8
On the first claim, based on the loading of the operating system
software into RAM, the defendants conceded that the act of turning on a
machine automatically loads the operating system software into RAM.' 0 9
The court in each case held explicitly that such loading into RAM creates
a copy that infringes the plaintiffs' copyrights." 0 The courts also held
that the unauthorized use of diagnostic software constitutes infringement
for the same reason: in using the software, the defendants created an
legitimate copies of Triad software, but it did not use those particular copies of the
software to service the customer's system).
103. MAI Sys., 991 F.2d at 517-19; Advanced Computer Servs., 845 F. Supp. at 361;
Triad Sys., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1242.
104. MAI Sys., 991 F.2d at 518 n.4; Advanced Computer Servs., 845 F. Supp. at 361;
Triad Sys., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1244 & n.5.
105. MAI Sys., 991 F.2d at 519; Advanced Computer Servs., 845 F. Supp. at 361.
106. Advanced Computer Servs., 845 F. Supp. at 367.
107. Contributory infringement, whereby one is held liable for another's infringement,
is not expressly actionable under the Copyright Act. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal
City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 434 (1984). However, the Supreme Court has held that a copy-
right owner can maintain an action for contributory infringement. Id. at 435 (citing Kalem
Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911)). Contributory infringement occurs when "one
who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to
the infringing conduct of another." Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Man-
agement, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971) (footnote omitted).
108. Conduct that does not implicate any of the exclusive rights inherent in a copyright,
such as the mere use of a work, does not constitute infringement. Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at
463 (Blackmun, J. dissenting) (stating that "[i]f the work is put to some use not enumerated
in § 106, the use is not an infringement"); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422
U.S. 151, 155 (1975) (stating "[i]f an unlicensed use of a copyrighted work does not conflict
with an 'exclusive' right conferred by the statute, it is no infringement of the holder's
rights").
109. MAI Sys., 991 F.2d at 518; Advanced Computer Servs., 845 F. Supp. at 360; Triad
Sys., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1243.
110. MAI Sys., 991 F.2d at 519; Advanced Computer Servs., 845 F. Supp. at 363; Triad
Sys., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1243-44. For a detailed discussion of the reasoning behind these
holdings, see infra notes 114-52 and accompanying text (analyzing why a RAM copy meets
the statutory definition of a "copy" that can infringe).
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infringing copy when the software was loaded into RAM.' The third
infringing activity, involving defendant's use of unlicensed software at
their facilities, was held to infringe plaintiffs' copyrights because the de-
fendants' use of the software made unauthorized copies in RAM.112 Fi-
nally, the ISOs were held liable for contributory infringement when they
induced their customers to let them use the plaintiffs' software, because
such use violated the license agreement and made RAM copies that vio-
lated the plaintiffs' copyrights." 3 In these three cases, the defendants at-
tempted to counter the infringement claims with several different
arguments, all of which failed.
C. The Defenses Offered in the Three Cases
1. RAM Copies Are Not "Fixed" and Therefore Fail To Meet the
Statutory Definition of a "Copy"
The defendants in all three of the ISO cases argued that RAM copies
do not infringe the plaintiff's copyright because RAM copies are not
"fixed in a tangible medium of expression,"114 and therefore cannot meet
the statutory definition of "copy.""' 5 Much of the discussion in the opin-
ions centered on this issue and analyzed the relevant statutes." 6
First, if the creation of a RAM copy infringes a copyright at all, it spe-
cifically infringes the copyright owner's exclusive right "to reproduce the
copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords."" 7 The Copyright Act de-
111. MAI Sys., 991 F.2d at 518 n.4; Triad Sys., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1244 n. 5. The only
difference between the RAM copy of the operating system software and the RAM copy of
the diagnostic software is that the diagnostic software is not loaded automatically into
RAM when the computer is turned on. MAI Sys., 991 F.2d at 518 n.4.
112. MAI Sys., 991 F.2d at 519; Advanced Computer Servs., 845 F. Supp. at 364.
113. Advanced Computer Servs., 845 F. Supp. at 367.
114. See MAI Sys., 991 F.2d at 518; Advance Computer Servs., 845 F. Supp. at 362-63;
Triad Sys., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1242-44. A "tangible medium of expression" is the physical
object that contains the copyrighted work of authorship. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note
30, at 52-53, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5665. For example, books, paintings, and
videotapes are all "tangible media of expression" containing stories, pictures, and movies,
which are the intangible property that is copyrighted. Id. Copyright protection does not
exist for works that are not "fixed," that is, do not exist in any physical object. Id. In other
words, a folk tale that is told and retold through generations but never written on paper or
recorded in any way does not receive copyright protection. See id.
115. MAI Sys., 991 F.2d at 517; Advanced Computer Servs., 845 F. Supp. at 362; Triad
Sys., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1243-44.
116. MAI Sys., 991 F.2d at 517-19; Advanced Computer Servs., 845 F. Supp. at 362-64;
Triad Sys., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1243-44.
117. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1988). See also H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 30, at 61,
reprinted in 1976 U.S.S.C.A.N. at 5675 ("[T]he right 'to reproduce the copyrighted work in
copies or phonorecords' means the right to produce a material object in which the work is
duplicated, transcribed, imitated, or simulated.").
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fines "copies" as "material objects ... in which a work is fixed." 118 A
work is "fixed" when it is stable enough to be perceived or reproduced
for more than a temporary period.119 The courts in the ISO cases applied
these definitions, and determined that they cover a version of a computer
program existing in RAM.'
A review of the case law examining this issue before MAI Systems, the
first ISO case, reveals little discussion on exactly how a RAM copy meets
the statutory definitions of "copies" and "fixed.' 12 ' None of these cases
applied the § 101 definitions of "copies" or "fixed," but instead relied on
either the conclusions of CONTU embodied in its Final Report, 2 or on
the conclusion of the leading commentator on copyright law,'123 or failed
to cite to any authority.'2 4
The CONTU Report reveals that a majority of the commission agreed
that a RAM copy meets the statutory definition and can infringe. 25 The
118. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (stating that copies are "material objects, other than pho-
norecords, in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and
from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device"). Congress added this definition in the
1976 revision to the Copyright Act in part to avoid the problem posed by case law holding
that a work that cannot be perceived by humans does not qualify as a copy. See H.R. REP.
No. 1476, supra note 30, at 52, reprinted in 1976 U.S.S.C.A.N. at 5665 (describing the
purpose behind § 101's definition of "copies").
119. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) ("A work is 'fixed' in a tangible medium of expression
when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is
sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.").
120. MAI Sys., 991 F.2d at 517-18; Advanced Computer Servs., 845 F. Supp. at 362;
Triad Sys., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1243-44; see infra notes 131-54 and accompanying text (ana-
lyzing how these cases apply the statutory definition of "copies" to RAM copies).
121. See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 261 (5th Cir. 1988); ISC-
Bunker Ramo Corp. v. Altech, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1310, 1332 (N.D. Ill. 1990); Bly v. Ban-
bury Books, Inc., 638 F. Supp. 983, 985 (E.D. Pa. 1986); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula
Int'l, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 617, 622 (C.D. Cal. 1984); Micro-Sparc, Inc. v. Amtype Corp., 592
F. Supp. 33, 35 & n.6 (D. Mass. 1984).
122. Vault, 847 F.2d at 260; Micro-Sparc, 592 F. Supp. at 34-35; see also infra note 125
(discussing CONTU's conclusion that RAM copies meet the statutory definition).
123. ISC-Bunker Ramo, 765 F. Supp. at 1332.
124. Bly, 638 F. Supp. at 985; Apple Computer, 594 F. Supp. at 622. While Bly dis-
cussed whether RAM copies were copies, the court did not need to decide the issue be-
cause defendants conceded infringement. Bly, 638 F. Supp. at 985. Likewise, the
discussion of the issue in Apple Computer is dicta. See MAI Sys., 991 F.2d at 519 (recog-
nizing "that this language [in Apple Computer] is not dispositive").
125. CONTU REPORT, supra note 21, at 22. The report states:
The text of the new copyright law makes it clear that the placement of a copy-
righted work into a computer-or, in the jargon of the trade, the 'inputting' of
it-is the preparation of a copy. This may be ascertained by reading together the
definitions of copies and fixed found in section 101.
1995]
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majority did, however, indicate that a RAM copy of a program may cease
to be a "copy" under the statute when each individual instruction is in-
serted into the computer's processor."2 6 At this point, the program be-
comes the workings of a machine, which is subject matter not protected
by copyright."2 7 Commissioner Hersey dissented on this issue, arguing
that RAM copies do not communicate with humans but rather with ma-
chines, and therefore should cease being copies under the statute when
they become part of a machine. 128
Interestingly, CONTU's position contradicts the apparent intent of the
drafters of the definitions of "copies" and "fixed"; the drafters apparently
intended to exclude RAM copies from these definitions in the legislative
history to the 1976 Act.'2 9 CONTU argued that this language was incor-
rect and should not be followed because the enacted definition of "fixed"
is clear and unambiguous. 3 ° No litigant or court has mentioned this lan-
guage in any reported case in discussing whether RAM copies are fixed.
In MAI Systems, the Ninth Circuit rejected the ISO's argument that
RAM copies are not "fixed" and therefore are not "copies."' 3' The court
126. Id. The report further states:
When a program is copied into the memory of a computer, it still exists in a form
from which a human-readable version may be produced. That is, the copy in the
computer's memory may be duplicated, just as a version listed on paper or coded
on magnetic tape may be. Only when the program is inserted-instruction by
instruction-into the processing element of the computer and electrical impulses
are sent through the circuitry of the processor to initiate work is the ability to
copy lost.
Id.
127. Id. Copyright protection subsists only in original works of authorship and ex-
pressly not in any "idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, princi-
ple, or discovery." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b) (1988). Works exhibiting these characteristics,
such as machines, are protected by patents. See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102
(1879) (stating that claims to inventions or discoveries are the "province of letters-patent,
not of copyright").
128. See CONTU REPORT, supra note 21, at 33 (stating that a computer program
should cease being a copy "at the moment of the program's transformation, by whatever
present or future technique, to a mechanical capability").
129. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 30, at 53, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5666
(concluding that "the definition of 'fixation' would exclude from the concept purely eva-
nescent or transient reproductions such as those projected briefly on a screen, shown elec-
tronically on a television or other cathode ray tube, or captured momentarily in the
'memory' of a computer") (emphasis added).
130. See CONTU REPORT, supra note 21, at 22 & n.111 (stating "[b]ecause works in...
[RAM] may be repeatedly reproduced, they are fixed and, therefore, are copies .... Inso-
far as a contrary conclusion is suggested in . . .[the House] report ..., this should be
regarded as incorrect and should not be followed, since legislative history need not be
perused in the construction of an unambiguous statute").
131. 991 F.2d 511, 518, cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 671 (1994).
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relied on a factual analysis and the prior law regarding RAM copies. 1 32
Most damaging to the ISO's argument was that its technicians could view
a "system error log," which is part of the operating system software, while
the software is in RAM.133 This fact, uncontroverted by the ISO, con-
vinced the court that the RAM copy of the software could be "perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated," and therefore met the fixation
requirements.13 1
The Eastern District of Virginia provided a more explicit analysis of
the fixation of RAM copies in Advanced Computer Services v. MAI Sys-
tems.135 First, the court clarified that the definition of "fixed" under the
statute does not require "absolute permanence," but only enough so that
the work can be "perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for
a period of more than transitory duration."' 36 Next, the court rejected
the ISO's argument that, because RAM is not a "material object" but
rather a "collection of positive and negative charges," programs loaded
into it cannot be "copies," which are defined as "material objects" under
the statute.' 37 According to the court, this conclusion runs contrary to
the Copyright Act's protection of computer programs, embodied in the
1980 amendments, and the definition of the subject matter of copyright,
which allows copyright protection for works requiring the aid of a
machine or device to be perceived. 138 More convincingly, the court
pointed out that RAM is finite and takes up space; that is, a copy of a
program in RAM reduces the amount of RAM available for other pro-
grams and data, and therefore is a material object.' 39
The ISOs, using the same argument made in MAI Systems, argued that
a RAM copy is too transient and ephemeral to be fixed because a RAM
132. Id. at 518-19. The court in MAI Sys. cited Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l,
Inc., 594 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal. 1984); Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255
(5th Cir. 1988); 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.08 (1989), and the CONTU REPORT, supra
note 21. See id. at 518-19. The court acknowledged that these authorities do not specify
whether the copy created is in RAM, in ROM, or on a magnetic disk. Id. at 519.
133. Id. at 518.
134. Id.
135. See 845 F. Supp. 356, 362-63 (E.D. Va. 1994).
136. Id. at 362-63.
137. Id. at 363; see also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (" 'Copies' are material objects ... in
which a work is fixed") (emphasis added). Note that this argument was not made in MAI
Sys. See MAI Sys., 991 F.2d at 511.
138. Advanced Computer Servs., 845 F. Supp. at 363 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)
(1988)). Section 102(a) provides that "[clopyright protection subsists.., in original works
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed,
from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly
or with the aid of a machine or device." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988). This section repeats
nearly verbatim the definition of "fixed" in § 101. See id. §§ 101-102.
139. Advanced Computer Servs., 845 F. Supp. at 363 n.8.
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copy disappears when the computer loses power. 140 This argument was
rejected for two reasons. First, as in MAI Systems, the Eastern District of
Virginia found that valuable information can be obtained from a RAM
copy by viewing the computer's screen or a paper printout. 41 Second,
this argument only shows that some RAM copies, those in which the
power is cut off soon after the program is loaded into RAM, may not be
sufficiently fixed.' 42 The copyright infringement claims in Advanced
Computer Services,'143 however, did not concern these short-lived RAM
copies; rather, the claims targeted the creation of those copies that were
used by the ISO's technicians when they serviced the computers.'"4 In
the court's view, these copies, which did communicate information to the
technicians, clearly were fixed.' 45 The Eastern District of Virginia relied
on several cases to support this conclusion, including MAI Systems. 4 7
140. Id. at 363.
141. Id. Another example, not offered by the court, is helpful on this point. One could
type an entire article or memorandum into a computer using a word processing program
without ever saving that document to the magnetic disk drive for permanent storage. Dur-
ing that time, one could produce multiple copies of the document on paper, and read it
from the screen. At all times this document would exist only in the computer's RAM.
142. Id. (noting that "MAI's copyright infringement claim is not aimed at situations
where the power to the computer is turned off and the RAM erased within a second of the
completion of loading," but rather it is aimed at those instances where the computer re-
mains on for minutes or longer).
143. This argument also would apply to the RAM copies in MAI Sys. and Triad Sys.
144. Advanced Computer Servs., 845 F. Supp. at 363.
145. Id.
146. The court cited Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988),
ISC-Bunker Ramo Corp. v. Altech, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1310 (N.D. I11. 1990), Apple Com-
puter, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775 (C.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd, 725 F.2d 521 (9th
Cir. 1984), and Micro-Sparc, Inc. v. Amtype Corp., 592 F. Supp. 33 (D. Mass. 1984). It
distinguished Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1283
(N.D. Cal. 1991) (holding that audiovisual displays created by videogame enhancers do not
qualify as derivative Works of the original videogame and, alternatively, are fair use of the
copyrighted video game), aff'd, 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1582
(1993). The ISOs cited Lewis Galoob Toys on the grounds that the decision concerned fair
use of a copyrighted work and not RAM copies. See Advance Computer Servs., 845 F.
Supp. at 364 n.9.
147. 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 671 (1994). The ISO offered
one final argument, that "copying" was a term of art in the computer industry that does not
include loading programs into RAM. Advanced Computer Servs., 845 F. Supp. at 364. The
ISO pointed out that if "copying" includes loading software into RAM, then valid software
licensees violate their license agreements each time they use the software, because the
license agreement prohibits "copying" of the software. Id. The court rejected this argu-
ment on the basis that "copying" is defined by the Copyright Act, and not by industry
usage or license agreements. Id.
The court reached the correct conclusion on this argument, and did not have to answer
the ISO's concern that valid licensees violate their license agreements, but the example
raises the specter of the software user's rights under § 117. See supra notes 47-70 and
accompanying text. The valid licensees would not breach their license agreements, but not
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In Triad Systems v. Southeastern Express,14s the Northern District of
California rejected additional arguments from an ISO as to why RAM
copies are not "fixed."' 4 9 First, the ISO argued that the RAM copy of the
operating system software was not fixed because it made no representa-
tions of its contents on the computer's video display screen, and thus did
not communicate information to. the user.150 The court rejected this posi-
tion because it contradicts those cases that hold that the computer pro-
grams that do not interact with the user, such as operating system
software, are protected by copyright law as much as interactive programs
like word processors. 151 The court also rejected the standard argument
that RAM copies do not reside in RAM long enough to be fixed, holding
that the short-lived RAM copies are the "functional equivalents" of the
longer-lasting copies from which one can perceive, reproduce, or commu-
nicate the contents of the program.' 52
Thus, the notion that RAM copies do not meet the statutory definitions
of "fixed" and "copies" appears untenable. For ISOs, and potentially
because of § 117. They would have either an express or implied license to make those
RAM copies that necessarily are made when they use the computer program. See Kreiss,
supra note 19, at 1539 (describing how licensees who "do not obtain immunity by means of
§ 117 ... are protected by contract"). This license would almost certainly be implied from
the right to use the program that is granted in every software license agreement. Id.
148. 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1239 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
149. Id. at 1243-44. Note that this court was bound by the Ninth Circuit's decision in
MAI Systems. The Ninth Circuit, in affirming the Northern District of California's prelimi-
nary injunction in favor of Triad Systems, agreed, without much discussion, with the district
court's analysis of whether RAM copies infringe. Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express
Co., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1028, 1030 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1995).
150. Triad Sys., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1243.
151. Id. (citing Apple Computer v. Formula Int'l, 725 F.2d 521, 525 (9th Cir. 1984)).
Other courts have adopted this view. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Com-
puter Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1251-53 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding that "an operating system pro-
gram is not per se precluded from copyright"), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984); GCA
Corp. v. Chance, 217 U.S.P.Q. 718 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 1982); Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro
Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
152. Triad Sys., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1243. The ISO also argued that because the Triad
computer only copied portions of the operating .system software into RAM at any one
time, the copying into RAM did not illicitly appropriate, or infringe, the copyrighted oper-
ating system software. Id. at 1243-44. This argument relies on the requirement in copy-
right law that a defendant's copying must appropriate a substantial portion of the
copyrighted work. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d. 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946) ("The question ...
is whether defendant took from plaintiff's work[ ] so much of [that which makes a work
valuable] ...that defendant wrongfully appropriated something which belongs to the
plaintiff"), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 851 (1947). The court rejected this argument without
much analysis, holding that the whole of a work need not be copied for infringement to be
found. Triad Sys., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1243-44 (relying on Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 551 (1985), which held that the determination of illicit appro-
priation depends on both the amount and substantiality of the material defendant copied).
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others, the effects of losing this argument are severe.'53 However, the
ISOs have advanced other arguments which may, if successful, alleviate
the problem.154
2. RAM Copies Are Non-Infringing Under § 117(1).
Just as CONTU intended, an obvious solution to the RAM copy prob-
lem is to interpret § 117, which defines as non-infringing those copies
made "as [ ] essential step[s]" in the use of that program, to include the
making of a RAM copy.155 Unfortunately, Congress' only change to
§ 117 to the CONTU recommended language - replacing "rightful pos-
sessors" with "owners,"' 56 - eliminates nearly all software users from its
protection, including users of the software in the ISO cases.' 57
The courts in the ISO cases have given this issue little attention.1 58 In
MAI Systems, the Ninth Circuit ruled in a footnote that customers do not
qualify as "owners" because they license the software.' 59 In Advance
Computer Services, 6 ° the Eastern District of Virginia only mentioned
§ 117 in its discussion of the contributory infringement claim,' 61 noting
153. See infra notes 249-253 and accompanying text. The "others" who may be affected
by the RAM copy problem include users of the Internet, online services, and computer
bulletin boards, because the activities involved in using these services necessarily create
RAM copies of the information on the service in the user's personal computer. INFORMA-
TION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, GREEN PAPER: IN-
TELLETUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE-A
PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY RIGHTS 65 n.205 (1994) [hereinafter Nil GREEN PAPER]. These activities include
"loading a work into a computer, scanning a printed work into a digital file, uploading or
downloading a work between a user's computer and a BBS or other server, and transmit-
ting a work from one computer to another .... " Id. (citing MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak
Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 671 (1994) and
Advanced Computer Servs. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Va. 1994)). Contra
Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 29, 39-42
(1994) (criticizing the conclusion of the Nil GREEN PAPER, and arguing that the law is not
settled on the issue of RAM copies and that the better result holds that RAM copies are
too transitory to infringe).
154. See infra text accompanying notes 187-243 (describing the ISOs' alternative
arguments).
155. 17 U.S.C. § 117(1) (1988); see also supra notes 42-90 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the elements of § 117).
156. See supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
157. This includes both the valid licensees of the program, such as MAI Systems' and
Triad Systems' customers, as well as the ISO's technicians, who could be "authorized" by
the customer to make the RAM copy in using the software to service the customer's
machine. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1988).
158. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text; Arriola, supra note 9, at 419-20.
159. MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 n.5 (9th Cir. 1993), cert.
dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 67 (1994).
160. Advanced Computer Servs. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Va. 1994).
161. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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that the customer's making of a RAM copy could be an underlying act of
infringement because, as a licensee, the customer would not be shielded
by § 117.162 Finally, in Triad Systems, 63 the Northern District of Califor-
nia held that § 117 did not apply to the ISO because it did not "own" the
customer's software. 16
4
Notably, the courts in these cases did not rely on an express clause in
the license agreement specifying that the title to the copy of the computer
program did not pass to the customer. 165 The courts ruled, sub silentio,
that a license agreement does not make the licensee an "owner of a copy
of a computer program" for the purposes of § 117.166 Thus, § 117 offers
little protection to the software user accused of infringement through the
creation of RAM copies. Only a valid license agreement, which is some-
thing the ISOs did not have, will provide the same protection as § 117
from suits based on infringing RAM copies.1
67
3. Copyright Misuse by the Software Producer
Copyright misuse is a copyright infringement defense of relatively re-
cent vintage.' 6 Recognized and upheld first by the Fourth Circuit in
Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 69 the defense's viability and appli-
cation remain uncertain. 170 Currently, as defined in Lasercomb, a misuse
defense will bar a claim for copyright infringement when the copyright
162. Advanced Computer Services, 845 F. Supp. at 367.
163. 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1239 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
164. Id. at 1242 n.4.; see supra note 61 (discussing why this rationale is flawed but its
result is correct). Note that the Ninth Circuit affirmed this conclusion without discussion.
Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1028, 1030 (9th Cir.
1995); see also supra note 95 (describing the procedural posture of the Ninth Circuit's
review of Triad Sys.).
165. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
166. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1988).
167. But see supra note 102 (noting that some of the ISOs had valid licenses, but these
licenses did not authorize the infringing conduct).
168. For a thorough discussion of the history and nature of the copyright misuse de-
fense, see Ramsey Hanna, Note, Misusing Antitrust: The Search for Functional Copyright
Misuse Standards, 46 STAN. L. REv. 401 (1994)(describing the history of the misuse de-
fense, and arguing that the copyright misuse defense should not be tied to establishing an
antitrust violation); Philip Abromats, Note, Copyright Misuse and Anticompetitive Software
Licensing Restrictions: Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 52 U. Pi-r. L. REv. 629
(1991)(arguing that the Fourth Circuit's application of the misuse doctrine to remedy an
anticompetitive clause in a license agreement went too far); Christina Ambrosio & Roni
Schneider, Note, Copyright Misuse ... Getting Defensive: Lasercomb America, Inc., v.
Reynolds, 6 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT 181 (1990) (affirming the validity of the copy-
right misuse defense, and proposing more definite standards for its application).
169. 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).
170. See Hanna, supra note 168, at 403.
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owner uses his or her copyright in violation of the public policy underly-
ing the copyright. 17
1
Relying predominately on Lasercomb,'72 the ISOs in Advance Com-
puter Services1 73 argued that the software producer had misused the
copyright in its software to violate the antitrust laws and public policy.' 74
Although not explicit in the decision, the ISOs apparently based their
defense, and their corresponding antitrust claims, on the ability of the
software producer to prevent ISOs without license agreements from com-
peting in the market for servicing their customers' computer systems and
software because such use necessarily creates RAM copies -that infringe
the software. 175
171. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 978 (noting that whether copyright misuse has occurred is
a question of whether a "copyright is being used in a manner violative of the public policy
embodied in the grant of a copyright"). In Lasercomb, the plaintiff, a software developer,
created a computer program that allowed a designer to create templates used by lasers to
produce steel rule die. Id. at 971. The plaintiff licensed this software to defendants with a
term in the license agreement that prevented the defendants from developing its own com-
puter-assisted die making software for 100 years. Id. at 972-73. Defendants then created a
computer program nearly identical to the plaintiff's program. Id. at 971. The plaintiff
brought multiple claims against defendants, including copyright infringement. Id. at 972.
The Fourth Circuit held that the defendants clearly had infringed the copyright in plain-
tiff's program. Id. However, the Fourth Circuit barred the plaintiff's infringement claim
by holding that the term of the license agreement preventing defendants from producing
competing software constituted copyright misuse. Id. at 979. In recognizing the copyright
misuse defense, the Fourth Circuit looked to patent law's recognition of the misuse defense
which had been upheld by the Supreme Court. Id. at 973 (citing United States Gypsum
Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457 (1957)). The Fourth Circuit examined the his-
tory behind both patents and copyrights, and determined that the policies supporting each
parallel the other. Id. at 974-76. The court held that the license agreement's broad restric-
tion on developing competing software was an attempt to gain control over the idea behind
its computer program, and consequently did not fall under the umbrella of copyright pro-
tection. Id. at 978 & n.19. The Fourth Circuit also asserted two other important points on
copyright misuse: (i) that while using a copyright to violate the antitrust laws would be
clear copyright misuse, the misuse need not rise to the level of an antitrust violation in
order to bar an infringement claim; id. at 978; and (ii) that, like patent misuse, the defense
is available even if the misuse does not harm the particular defendants. Id. at 979. Never-
theless, the type and level of misuse needed to support the defense, which does not amount
to an antitrust violation, remains unclear. See generally Hanna, supra note 168, at 416-18
(arguing that the copyright misuse defense should not be tied to establishing an antitrust
violation).
172. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 970.
173. 845 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Va. 1994).
174. Id. at 367. Although, at the time of MAI Systems' actions against Peak Computer
and other ISOs, MAI Systems no longer built computers, it did remain in the market for
servicing its computers. Id. at 359. It controlled approximately 90% of the market for
servicing MAI Systems computers. Id.
175. See, e.g., id. at 367 (stating that MAI Systems used its copyrights "to prevent ...
[the ISOs] from performing the normal maintenance of MAI computers"); Id. at 370 (stat-
ing "[s]pecifically, . . . [the ISOs] assert that MAI's requirement that ... [the ISOs] refrain
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The Eastern District of Virginia rejected the defense, on two
grounds. 176 First, in rejecting the ISOs' antitrust claims, the District
Court also rejected the misuse claims based on violations of the antitrust
laws. 177 Second, the District Court rejected the ISOs' claim that MAI
Systems' use of its copyright violated public policy because MAI Systems'
license agreements did not contain restrictions to prevent the develop-
ment of competing software, like those in Lasercomb, and because MAI
Systems had a right to recoup the investment in its copyrighted software
through higher service fees.
178
Likewise, in Triad Systems, 179 the Northern District of California re-
jected an ISO's claim that the software manufacturer misused its copy-
right to leverage its position in the computer maintenance market. 180 As
in Advance Computer Services, 8' the Northern District of California re-
lied on the ISO's failure to prove its antitrust claims and the fact that
copyright entitles the owner to enforce restrictive licensing agree-
ments.182 Both Advanced Computer Services and Triad Systems relied on
the Fourth Circuit's decision in Service & Training, Inc. v. Data General
Corp. ,183 decided after Lasercomb. In Data General, the Fourth Circuit
rejected an ISO's antitrust and copyright misuse claims based on the com-
puter hardware and software manufacturer's refusal to sell or license di-
agnostic software to all customers, including ISOs.'" In rejecting the
misuse defense, the Data General court relied on the failure of the ISO's
antitrust claims and on the conclusion that the software developer was
from loading MAI's copyrighted software constitutes an attempt to monopolize the MAI
computer service market"); see also supra notes 114-54 and accompanying text (discussing
why RAM copies infringe the copyright in the computer software).
176. Advanced Computer Servs., 845 F. Supp. at 367.
177. Id. at 367-70.
178. Id. at 367. MAI Systems can charge higher fees in order to recoup its investment
in the development of diagnostic software because it holds the exclusive license to the
diagnostic software needed to service MAI computers. See id.
179. 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1239 (N.D. Cal. 1994), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other
grounds, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1028 (9th Cir. 1995).
180. Id. at 1249. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's copyright misuse analy-
sis with little discussion. Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1028, 1033-34 (9th Cir. 1995); see also note 95 (describing the procedural posture of
the Ninth Circuit's review of Triad Sys.).
181. 845 F. Supp. at 367.
182. Triad Sys., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1249.
183. 963 F.2d 680 (4th Cir. 1992).
184. Id. The decision refers to the service organization as a third-party maintenance
company or TPM. Id. at 682. A TPM is the same as an ISO. Id.
1995]
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 45:181
within its exclusive rights under copyright to license its diagnostic
software selectively. 18
5
Thus, the viability of a copyright misuse defense to an infringement
action based on copying into RAM is suspect. Judicial uncertainty about
the precise contours and requirements of the defense, and reluctance by
the courts to impose antitrust liability on a copyright owner for actions
taken pursuant to her rights under copyright law create this suspicion.
186
So long as copyright law provides a software producer with rights to pre-
vent the unauthorized creation of RAM copies, actions taken to enforce
these rights will not be a misuse of copyright.
4. Fair Use
Fair use is the broadest and most important limitation on the exclusive
rights granted to a copyright owner."8 7 First codified in the 1976 revision
to the Copyright Act,' 88 the judicial doctrine is an "equitable rule of rea-
son," 189 which examines the particular facts and circumstances of the de-
fendant's use to determine whether that use should be allowed
notwithstanding its infringement.' 9° A use will be considered fair when it
promotes the policies underlying the grant of a copyright. 19'
185. Id. at 686, 690. The Fourth Circuit stated that "Data General [,the copyright
owner,] may lawfully license [its software] to whomever it chooses." Id. at 686. The court
further stated that "[N]o evidence [exists] that Data General did anything beyond limiting
the use of the software to repair and maintenance of specific computer hardware, activity
that is protected as an exclusive right of a copyright owner." Id. at 690.
186. See, e.g., Triad Sys., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1252 & n.9 (rejecting the ISO's antitrust and
unfair trade practices claims because the software producer's RAM copy infringement po-
sition was a "good faith opinion[ ] regarding the state of the law"); Advanced Computer
Servs. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 368-70 (E.D. Va. 1994) (rejecting ISOs' anti-
trust claims on grounds that MAI Systems' activity was "within ... [its] discretion to pro-
tect its copyrighted works," and where MAI Systems was "simply attempting to protect the
rights accruing to it as the holder of valid copyrights in its software").
187. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 30, at 65, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5678 (stating that fair use is "one of the most important and well-established limitations on
the exclusive right of copyright owners").
188. Id.
189. Id.; see also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560
(1985); Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 448 & n.31 (1984).
190. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 549.
191. Id. These policies are enumerated in the United States Constitution, Art. I § 8, cl.
8 ("to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
Book and movie reviews serve as classic examples of fair use. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988)
(listing "criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching ... , scholarship, or research" as ex-
amples of fair use). Although critics often copy the most important parts of the work they
review, such copying is excused because it promotes the discussion and consideration of
the works by the public. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 550 (describing how a "reviewer may
fairly cite largely from the original work, if his design be really and truly to use the
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Section 107 of the Copyright Act provides a statutory framework for
the fair use analysis, listing four non-exclusive factors required by the
statute to be considered.' 92 The factors enumerated concern the purpose
and nature of the infringing use,' 93 the nature of the copyrighted work,
the sum and substance of what the defendant's use takes from the copy-
righted work, and how the defendant's use harms the potential market
and value of the copyrighted work.'94
In both Advanced Computer Services and Triad Systems, the ISOs
claimed that the making of RAM copies constituted a fair use of the op-
erating system software.195 In both Advanced Computer Services and
Triad Systems, the trial court rejected the ISOs' fair use defense.' 96 Ex-
amining the analyses performed by both courts gives insight into what
passages for the purposes of fair and reasonable criticism") (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F.
Cas. 342, 344-45 (C.C. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901)).
192. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (Supp. IV 1992). The statute provides:
§ 107. Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair Use
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copy-
righted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by
any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, com-
ment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining
whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to
be considered shall include -
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such
finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.
Id. This codification was "intended to restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not
to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way." H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 30, at 66,
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5680. Thus, pre-1976 fair use case law remains in-
structive on current fair use determinations. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560 (quoting
H.R. REP. No. 1476).
193. Fair use is a defense to copyright infringement raised by the alleged infringer.
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164,1177 (1994); Harper & Row, 471 U.S.
at 561.
194. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
195. Advanced Computer Servs. v. MAI Sys., Inc., 845 F. Supp. 356, 364 (E.D. Va.
1994); Triad Sys.. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1239, 1244
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 1994).
196. Advanced Computer Services, 845 F. Supp. at 366 (granting summary judgment in
favor of the copyright owner on the fair use issue); Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Ex-
press Co., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1028, 1031 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that the trial court
granted directed verdicts for Triad Systems on the issue of fair use at the close of the
evidence). In Triad Systems, the Northern District of California analyzed the fair use issue
19951
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 45:181
may be the best solution to the RAM copy problem. Three separate in-
fringing uses of computer software are claimed to be fair use in these two
cases: (i) the making of RAM copies in the use of operating system
software; (ii) the making of RAM copies in the use of diagnostic
software; and (iii) the making of archival copies on magnetic disk and
tape during routine maintenance of the computer systems, 97 the last of
which was considered in Triad Systems only.198 In Advanced Computer
Services, the Eastern District of Virginia treated the first two uses to-
gether,199 while in Triad Systems, the Northern District of California ana-
lyzed each separately, yet still concluded that neither use qualified as fair
use.
200
a. The Purpose and Character of the Use
This factor examines the infringing use.20' In general, a commercial
use of a work weighs against a finding of fair use, 202 while a non-profit or
educational use, or one of those uses listed in the first paragraph of
§ 107,203 generally weighs in favor of fair use.204 In both Advanced Com-
puter Services and Triad Systems, the district courts found that making
RAM copies of the operating system software and diagnostic software in
the course of servicing a customer's machine was a commercial use.20 5
In Advanced Computer Services, the Eastern District of Virginia ap-
plied the so-called "Sony presumption" to the commercial use, finding
at the summary judgment stage, refusing to grant summary judgment in favor of Triad
Systems and against fair use. Triad Sys., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1245.
197. This last use does not involve RAM copies and will not be discussed in this
Comment.
198. Advanced Computer Servs., 845 F. Supp. at 364; Triad Sys., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1245.
199. Advanced Computer Servs., 845 F. Supp. at 364-66.
200. Triad Sys., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1245 (finding that use of the diagnostic software was
not fair use); Triad Sys., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1032-33 (affirming district court's rejection of fair
use defense on use on operating software).
201. Fair use analysis should only be used after a finding of infringement because it is
an affirmative defense. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1177 (1994).
202. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1174; Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464
U.S. 417, 449 (1984); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1521 (9th Cir.
1992); Triad Sys., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1247; Advanced Computer Servs., 845 F. Supp. at 365.
The Campbell court made clear, however, that the first statutory factor "call[s] for no hard
evidentiary presumption" that cuts off the fair use analysis after a finding of fair use. 114 S.
Ct. at 1174.
203. These uses include "criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching ... , scholarship,
or research." 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
204. Sony, 464 U.S. at 449; Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1171 (holding that analysis of this
factor "may be guided by the examples given in the preamble to § 107").
205. Advanced Computer Servs., 845 F. Supp. at 365; Triad Sys., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1247
(N.D. Cal.); Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1028, 1033
(9th Cir. 1995).
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that this factor weighed against fair use.20 6 It also rejected the ISOs'
claim that the use provides a "public benefit" in providing MAI custom-
ers with inexpensive service alternatives. °7
In Triad Systems, at the summary judgment stage, the Northern District
of California found that the use of operating system software in RAM is
"incidental" to the servicing of the customer's machine, and therefore the
ISO does not derive a significant amount of commercial gain from this
use.20 8 Also, unlike the Eastern District of Virginia, the Northern Dis-
trict of California accepted the ISOs' claim that such a use provides the
public benefits of choice and price competition.20 9 Thus, the commercial
nature of this use does not weigh against a finding of fair use.210 How-
ever, the use of a customer's diagnostic software does provide the ISO
with commercial gain because it receives the benefit of the program with-
out licensing for the software. 1 ' Therefore, the Northern District of Cal-
ifornia found that the use of this software weighed against fair use.212
Later, however, the court rejected the ISO's fair use defense and granted
a directed verdict and preliminary injunction in favor of Triad Systems on
the fair use issue.13 In its opinion affirming this decision, the Ninth Cir-
cuit relied heavily on the commercial nature of the use in rejecting the
fair use defense. 214 No mention was made of the district court's findings
at the summary judgment stage. 15
206. Advanced Computer Servs., 845 F. Supp. at 365. The "Sony presumption" arose
from Supreme Court dicta which said "every commercial use of copyrighted material is
presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner
of the copyright .. " Sony, 464 U.S. at 451. See also Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell,
972 F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992) (relying on commercial nature of parody to deny fair use
defense), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994). This analysis is no longer valid after the Supreme
Court's decision in Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1174, which rejected the application of hard
presumptions in a fair use analysis.
207. Advanced Computer Servs., 845 F. Supp. at 365. The court noted that the custom-
ers freely entered into license agreements that prohibited third-party access to the
software. Id. These agreements are legitimate methods for the software producer to
recoup its investment in developing the software. Id.





213. Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1028, 1031
(9th Cir. 1995).
214. Id. at 1033. The Ninth Circuit said that "we detect no appreciable public benefit
arising from Southeastern's practice to justify this continuance under the fair use doctrine,"
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b. The Nature of the Copyrighted Work
This factor focuses on the infringed work. In general, the use of fic-
tional and creative works weighs against fair use,"16 while the use of func-
tional, informational, or factual works weighs in favor of fair use. 17 In
Advanced Computer Services, the Eastern District of Virginia concluded
that the software, despite being essentially functional, was a creative
work, largely because the software producer had invested a large amount
of time and money in its creation. 18 Thus, this factor weighed against
fair use.219 The Northern District of California in Triad Systems, at the
summary judgment stage, analyzed to what extent the operating system
software contained expression that is protectable under copyright.220
After concluding that the operating system software contained little pro-
tectable expression, and thus was more functional than creative, the
Northern District of California held that this factor weighed in favor of
fair use.22' In contrast to its detailed analysis of the operating system
software, the Triad Systems court summarily concluded that the diagnos-
tic software was not as functional, so this factor weighed against fair
use.222 It is unclear how the court weighed this factor when it later re-
jected the ISO's fair use defense in issuing the preliminary injunction.
The Ninth Circuit simply concluded the opposite without analysis when it
affirmed the district court's preliminary injunction. 23
c. The Amount and Substantiality of the Portions Copied
This factor focuses on both the copyrighted work and the infringing
work. Copying an entire work usually weighs against fair use, 2 4 but the
216. Advanced Computer Servs. v. MAI Sys., 845 F. Supp. 356, 365 (E.D. Va. 1994)
(noting the distinction between informational, functional, or factual works and creative
works); Triad Sys., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1247-48 (noting that this factor reflects the idea/ex-
pression dichotomy in copyright law); see also Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d
1510, 1524 (9th Cir. 1992) (discussing the distinction between fictional and factual works).
217. Advanced Computer Servs., 845 F. Supp. at 365; Triad Sys., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1247-
48 (noting the dichotomy in copyright law between unprotected ideas and protected
expression).
218. 845 F. Supp. at 365 & n.11.
219. Id. at 365.
220. Triad Sys., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1248.
221. Id. at 1249.
222. Id.
223. Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1028, 1033
(9th Cir. 1995). The Ninth Circuit said only that "both the [operating software] and service
software are protected expression," and thus copying them weighs against fair use. Id.
224. Advanced Computer Servs. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 365 (E.D. Va.
1994). But see Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1526 (9th Cir. 1992)
(noting that even copying an entire work may not preclude a finding of fair use); Sony
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court should perform both a quantitative and qualitative analysis,22 5 so
copying a small but very important portion could still militate against fair
use.226 This factor weighed against fair use in Advanced Computer Serv-
ices, because the Eastern District of Virginia found that entire copies of
the operating system and diagnostic software were made in RAM.227 The
Northern District of California in Triad Systems ruled on summary judg-
ment that although not all of the software was loaded into RAM, the
portions that were copied into RAM constituted a substantial amount of
the copyrighted work, and therefore this factor weighed against fair
use.228 The Ninth Circuit ruled that this factor weigh against fair use be-
cause the programs were copied in their entirety. 29
d. The Effect pf the Use on the Potential Market
The effect of the use on the potential market is the most important
factor in the fair use analysis.2 3° This factor examines whether the actual
and potential markets for the copyrighted work would be harmed if the
infringing use became widespread.2 3' Harm to an actual market is shown
by a reasonable probability that a causal connection exists between the
infringing use and a loss of revenue, which the infringing party can rebut
by showing that the harm would have ensued had there been no copy-
right infringement. 32 In addition, the copyright owner can argue against
fair use by demonstrating harm to a potential market, such as those for
derivative works based on the original copyrighted work. 33
Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (holding that videotaping of
entire television programs for private non-commercial use was fair use).
225. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1104, 1175 (1994).
226. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564-65
(1985) (copying of only 13% of the words in Gerald Ford's memoirs found to weigh against
fair use because the words taken were the heart of the memoirs).
227. Advanced Computer Servs., 845 F. Supp. at 366.
228. Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1239, 1249
(N.D. Cal. 1994), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1028
(9th Cir. 1995); see also supra, note 152 (discussing whether the amount copied into RAM
affects an infringement claim).
229. Triad Sys., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1033.
230. E.g., Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566 & n.9.
231. Triad Sys., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1245; Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d
1510, 1523 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984)).
232. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 567-68. A clear example of an infringing use that
harms an actual market would be the duplication of one piece of commercial software onto
multiple disks and subsequent sale to the general public for half of the retail price.
233. See id. An example of harm to a potential market would be adapting a computer
program sold commercially for one computer system to run on another computer system
for which the software producer has not yet developed its program.
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The Eastern District of Virginia in Advanced Computer Services sum-
marily concluded that the ISOs' infringing use of its customers' MAI
software harmed the actual market for fees paid by the ISOs for the li-
cense to use MAI's software, relying on the other alleged presumption
that follows from a commercial use of a work. 34 Although confronted
with issues of fact that precluded summary judgment on this issue, the
Northern District of California in Triad Systems examined the markets in
more depth, concluding that the following markets were relevant: i) the
market for licensing Triad software to primary customers-as opposed to
service companies or resellers-such as auto parts dealers; ii) the market
for licensing operating system software to ISOs; and iii) the market for
licensing diagnostic software to ISOs.23 5 The court held that the ISO's
use of customers' software would harm only the last two markets; that is,
those regarding licensing software to the ISOs.2 36 Further, because the
customer is licensed to turn on her computer and make a RAM copy of
the operating system software, conceivably she could do so before the
ISO technician began to service the machine and therefore avoid in-
fringement.2 37 Because of this, the real market affected by the infringing
use relates to how much the customer and/or the ISO would be willing to
pay to avoid this inconvenient procedure and allow the ISO technician to
start the machine herself.238 However, the court did not apply this rea-
soning to the market for diagnostic software.239
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit found that this factor weighed against fair
use for two main reasons. 4° First, the use does not create any new work
or otherwise benefit the market.2 4' Second, allowing the ISO to use the
software would negatively impact Triad Systems' licensing revenues.2 42
234. Advanced Computer Servs. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 366 (E.D. Va.
1994). Similar to the first factor, this analysis is no longer valid in light of Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1177 (1994), which rejected the use of presump-
tions based on commercial use, at least in cases that involve more than mere duplication of
a work for commercial purposes.
235. Triad Systems, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1246-47.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1246.
238. Id.
239. Id. It is unclear why this is so. Conceivably, a customer licensed to use the diag-
nostic software could start the software, thereby creating an authorized RAM copy, and
then could allow the ISO technician to use the software, thus avoiding infringement.
240. Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1028, 1033
(9th Cir. 1995).
241. Id.
242. Id. The court concluded that permitting such use "would likely cause a significant
adverse impact on Triad's licensing and service revenues and lower returns on its copy-




The court made no mention of the markets described by the district court
on summary judgment.
Thus, despite the rejection of the defense in both Triad Systems and
Advanced Computer Services, the equitable nature of the fair use defense
makes it the most viable defense to infringement by RAM copies. 24 3
Moreover, analyzing the fair use factors with a complete understanding of
the nature of computer programs should result in a favorable finding of
fair use.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE RAM COPY PROBLEM
A. When Copyright Law Fails
In all of these cases, the courts stand on firm ground in holding that
placing a computer program into RAM creates a fixed copy that can in-
fringe the software producer's copyright.244 The language of the statu-
tory definition applies to the nature of RAM and the how the program
exists in RAM. 45 The legislative history of the relevant statutes, except
for one report, reaches the same conclusion.2 46 Several cases agree, and
no court has ruled otherwise.2 47 The various counter-arguments do not
fare well against these authorities, 48 and thus, the conclusion seems
correct.
Yet this conclusion leads to patently unfair results. As a result of the
decisions in the ISO cases, computer companies like MAI Systems and
Triad Systems can obtain a legal monopoly on the market for servicing its
computers.2 49 Essentially, the customer cannot obtain service from any
243. See infra notes 257-70 and accompanying text (proposing alternative arguments on
the statutory fair use analysis in favor of finding RAM copies fair).
244. See supra text accompanying notes 114-54.
245. See supra text accompanying notes 114-54.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 125-28. Contra Litman, supra note 153, at 39-
42 (arguing that the law is not settled on the issue and that the better result holds that
RAM copies are too transitory to infringe).
247. See supra text accompanying notes 130-54.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 130-67.
249. One might argue, as the courts have done, see supra notes 182-85 and accompany-
ing text, that the ISOs could continue to service MAI's customers by paying for the proper
license to use the software from MAI. This assumes that MAI would license an ISO,
although it has no legal obligation to do so. See Service & Training, Inc. v. Data Gen.
Corp., 963 F.2d 680, 686 (4th Cir. 1992); see also supra text accompanying notes 182-85.
Furthermore, the economic incentives for MAI to license ISOs no longer exists because it
is solely in the business of servicing its computers and no longer manufactures computer
systems and software. Advanced Computer Servs. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356,
359 (E.D. Va. 1994).
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other company.250 Although the courts have found that these results do
not violate antitrust law, they have not yet considered the results in light
of the public policies behind the grant of a copyright.2 5 1 Furthermore,
the infringing RAM copy grants to the owners of a copyright in computer
software a level of control over the use of their works not available with
any other copyrightable work. Because the use of any software program
necessarily creates a RAM copy, unauthorized use of software always
equals copyright infringement. Copyright law does not provide control
over the use of a copy for any other type of work. 52 Arguably, Con-
gress' change to CONTU's recommended legislation was intended to al-
low software owners to control the use of the work through licenses and
other non-sale transfers . 53 But this change should not allow software
producers to avail themselves of the remedies under the Copyright Act
for mere breaches of contract.
The holding that RAM copies fail to meet the statutory definition of
copy, and therefore cannot infringe, alleviates these problems without
jeopardizing the rights of the copyright owner. For example, this holding
does not free the ISO from infringement claims based on unauthorized
copying of the computer programs onto magnetic disk or tape.2 54 Also,
provided the license in question prohibits access to third parties, the
copyright owner would have a claim for tortious interference with con-
tract against the ISOs who convince the customer to allow them to use
250. While this situation appears to be an antitrust violation, the ISOs have not been
successful in proving such a claim. See supra notes 169-86 and accompanying text.
251. The Northern District of California, in refusing to grant summary judgment
against the ISOs before a full factual development on the fair use issue, has gone the fur-
thest in addressing the problem in terms of copyright policy.
252. In many respects, this may be a function of a computer program's unique status as
the only type of work defined by its utilitarian nature. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (defining
a "computer program" as "a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indi-
rectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result") (emphasis added). Gener-
ally, the purpose, use, or function of a work have no place in copyright law. See id.
(defining "[p]ictoral, graphic, and sculptural works" to exclude the design of a useful arti-
cle that is not physically or conceptually separable from the utilitarian aspects of the arti-
cle, and to limit the protection under copyright to the form of the works and not their
"mechanical or utilitarian" aspects); cf. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S.
239, 251 (1903) (holding that pictorial works used in commercial advertisements are enti-
tled to the copyright protection as much as works of fine art).
253. See supra note 67.
254. Note that in at least two of the ISO cases, the ISOs had possessed at their facilities
unlicensed copies of the software on hard drives and floppy disks. MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak
Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 671 (1994);
Advanced Computer Servs. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 361 (E.D. Va. 1994).
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the software.255 Such a holding supports the policy behind § 117, which
was intended to alleviate the threat of copyright infringement created by
the ordinary use of computer programs.256 Despite its advantages, be-
cause this position runs contrary to a number of authorities, it is unlikely
to be adopted by the courts.
B. How Fair Use Can Solve the RAM Copy Problem
The best solution to the RAM copy problem is an amendment to
§ 117.257 Otherwise, the most viable solution to the problem is that the
RAM copy should be deemed a fair use of a computer program. An
analysis of the four statutory factors reveals that all four should weigh in
favor of fair use.258
1. The Purpose and Character of Making a RAM Copy Make the
Use Fair
With regard to the first factor-the purpose and character of the in-
fringing use-the Supreme Court's latest fair use case 259 severely weak-
ens the treatment of this factor found in the ISO cases, which places great
reliance on a presumption against fair use allegedly arising from commer-
cial use. Moreover, the purpose behind a RAM copy is the use of a com-
puter program. This purpose comports with the definition of "computer
program" and with the purpose intended by the copyright owner.260 That
someone other than the licensee uses the program does not change this
conclusion, because that type of limitation on use is a matter of contract,
not copyright law.261 Moreover, the use of software in the ISO cases was
always ultimately for the benefit of the valid licensee-the customer who
255. Presumably, the copyright owner also would have a breach of contract action
against the customer, although the effect that bringing such an action would have on cus-
tomer relations makes this claim only theoretical.
256. See supra note 77 (explaining further the purpose of § 117).
257. See supra note 21 (describing a recent bill in Congress that would change the word
"owner" in § 117 to "rightful possessor"). For an example of a proposed amendment to
§ 117 that is particularly user-friendly, see Stem, supra note 50, at 483-85.
258. See supra notes 187-94 and accompanying text (describing the statutory analysis of
fair use under 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988)).
259. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1174 (1994) (holding that
prior Supreme Court decisions on fair use do not require hard evidentiary presumptions
arising from commercial use).
260. See CONTU REPORT, supra note 21, at 13 ("Obviously, creators, lessors, licensors,
and vendors of copies of programs intend that [the programs] be used by their
customers.").
261. See, e.g., National Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Intl., 991 F.2d 426,
430 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that the Copyright Act does not preempt a breach of contract
claim based on a license that restricts third-party use of software because the contract
created "a right not existing under the copyright law").
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needed service on his computer so he could continue using the
software-so that the purpose behind RAM copies made by ISOs ulti-
mately remains the same as that of the copyright owner - the use of the
computer program by the customer.
2. The Nature of Computer Programs Should Excuse the
Infringement of RAM Copies
Regarding the second factor, concerning the nature of the infringed
work, the traditional analyses employed in the cases262 overlook some
obvious facts about the nature of computer programs, which are defined
by the Copyright Act as works that are "to be used" by a computer.2 63
Thus, their "nature" entails use which necessarily results in the making of
RAM copies.26 Therefore, the nature of computer software, when
viewed in the context of the necessary creation of RAM copies, should
weigh in favor of fair use.2 65
3. The Amount and Substantiality Copied in Making a RAM Copy
Does Not Preclude Fair Use
Furthermore, the third statutory factor, regarding the amount and sub-
stantiality copied from the infringed work, weighs in favor of fair use for
the simple reason that the infringing party does not determine how much
and what parts of a program are copied into RAM. Rather, this is dcter-
mined by the designer of the computer program.266 The traditional anal-
ysis of this factor depends on what the infringing party selected to copy,
as is shown by its relation to the first factor, regarding the purpose and
262. In particular, in Advanced Computer Services, the conclusion that the computer
software is creative because of the money and time invested in its production, see 845 F.
Supp. 356, 365 (E.D. Va. 1994), runs contrary to Supreme Court precedent that copyright
rewards original authorship, not hard work. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co.,
499 U.S. 340, 353 (1991); see also Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1527
(9th Cir. 1990) (relying on Feist to reject the argument that considerable time, effort, and
money invested in a work militates against fair use). Note that all of the cases relied on by
the court were decided before Feist. See Advanced Computer Servs., 845 F. Supp. at 365.
263. See supra note 37 (defining a computer program).
264. See supra notes 71-90 and accompanying text.
265. An analogous situation would be where a court analyzes whether the content of a
videotaped docudrama, an audiovisual work, is creative or factual to determine whether
the mere viewing of the tape through a television and VCR is fair use. See supra note 224
and accompanying text.
266. See MALCOLM P. ATKINSON, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPUTER Sci. 864-65 (Anthony
Ralston & Edwin D. Reilly eds., 3d ed. 1993) (describing the various methods program-
mers use when determining how to allocate instructions and data into RAM).
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character of the infringing use.267 Thus, the amount and substantiality of
the work copied by a RAM copy should not weigh against fair use.
4. The Making of RAM Copies Does Not Harm the Market for the
Computer Program
The harm to the potential market for the infringed work, should not
weigh against the conclusion that an ISO's use of a customer's software is
fair use. The relevant market is the licensing of the software to ISOs,
which is allegedly harmed by the ISO's use of a customer's software in
lieu of licensing its own copy. While the ISO's use of a customer's
software obviates its need to license their own copy, and thus harms the
software producer's market, this harm is not caused by the creation of
infringing RAM copies, which is the precise act being analyzed for fair
use. Rather, the harm is caused when the customer allows the ISO tech-
nician to use the software, an act that violates the license agreement, not
copyright law. This position is confirmed by assuming that the use of the
software did not create a RAM copy and did not infringe.268 In such a
case, the harm to the market would still exist; that is, the ISO still would
avoid paying the license fee for the use of the software.26 9
In short, courts should consider facts such as these, which reflect the
nature of computer programs, in considering the fair use issue. These
considerations tilt the fair use scale towards the ISO and any other user
of software potentially threatened with copyright infringement claims.
Furthermore, the holding that the making of RAM copies is a fair use
does not upset the policies underlying copyright law and provides
software users with the comfort intended by CONTU.27 ° Moreover, the
fact-bound nature of the framework for analyzing fair use issues allows a
court to accommodate future circumstances where the fair use of
software through RAM copies may not promote the policies of copyright
267. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1104, 1175 (1994). On this
factor, "attention turns to the persuasiveness of a parodist's justification for the particular
copying done .... [which] harken[s] back to the first of the statutory factors." Id.; see
Harper & Row Publishing, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564-65 (1985) (examining
this factor in light of the reasons why the defendant selected only certain portions of the
work).
268. Such a situation would occur if the program existed in permanent Read-Only-
Memory, like those in calculators and electronic dictionaries, where no copy is made dur-
ing the use of the program.
269. In other words, an ISO can rebut the prima facie case of infringement by showing
that the harm to the market still would exist even if its conduct did not appropriate the
software producer's work. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 567-68.
270. Supra note 77 (discussing CONTU's purpose).
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law. For these reasons, fair use should be used by courts to prevent the
inequities caused by the RAM copy problem.
V. CONCLUSION
The RAM copy presents an unusual problem in law: one where care-
ful, correct legal analysis leads to unfair results. An amendment to § 117
would provide the best solution to this problem. Until such an amend-
ment is enacted, rather than disregard the clear dictates of the law, the
courts should strive to find an equitable solution that also results from
careful and correct legal analysis. The courts can achieve this solution
through the proper use of the fair use doctrine.
Jule L. Sigall
